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ABSTRACT
This paper aims to explore the role of the universal banking system in contributing to the
stock market bust in the wake of the nancial crisis 2008-9 when bankers might have incentive
to hide information from shareholders. We set up a stylized model of consumption smoothing
involving universal banks that undertake both investment and commercial banking activities.
Banks have private information about the outcome of a project that it funds. In the wake of
bad news about the project, the banker has an incentive to sell lemon shares in a secondary
market with the pretence of a liquidity crunch. Our model shows that such an incentive
results in: (i) a sharp discounting of stock prices, (ii) greater loan demand (iii) higher fraction
of bank ownership of the borrowing rms, and (iv) heightened consumption risk resulting
in precautionary savings by households. The magnitude of these e¤ects depends on the
markets perception about the preponderance of lemons in the stock market. A credible
punishment scheme implemented by the government in the form of nes may moderate the
stock market decline and consumption volatility due to information friction. However, it
imposes a deadweight loss on private citizens because of a fall in all banksexpected prot.
On the other hand, a "ring-fenced" banking arrangement along the way suggested by the
Vickers Commission may entail a rst order welfare loss due to the lack of diversication
opportunities.
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I. Introduction
Following the nancial crisis of 2008-9, a wave of papers appeared in the nance and eco-
nomics literature exploring the diagnostics of the stock market crash. The aim of this paper is
to explore the role of universal banking arrangement in contributing to the collapse of the stock
market and related economic activities. A universal bank combines investment and commercial
banking by holding and underwriting securities of non nancial rms while performing its usual
commercial banking operations. In recent times, functioning of all such activities under the um-
brella of a single nancial institution has been a subject of much heated debates. A prevailing
notion is that such nancial integration gave rise to a conict of interest between retail and
investment banking activities which manifested in terms of banks hiding information from its
clients and selling lemon securities to ordinary citizens. In a recent book, Akerlof and Shiller
(2015) argue that investment banks sold complex nancial instruments that contained lemons.
Since the public failed to perceive the quality of the mutual funds they were buying, it gave
rise to a typical lemon problem in the stock market triggering a crash. Thus, a stock market
bust could be the end result of a potential conict of interest between bankers and ordinary
shareholders endemic to the universal banking system.
In this paper, we set up a stylized model of consumption smoothing and banking to demon-
strate how such a lemon problem could contribute to a stock market bust. We rst show that
the institution of universal banking works best in the absence of any such information friction as
it provides a perfect consumption risk sharing opportunity to the households. However, due to
the universal banks multifarious nancial activities, the system potentially generates an agency
problem in terms of bankers using private information to their own advantage. This happens
because the banker/underwriter who has funded risky projects has private information about
the potential success or failure of the projects. If hit by a bad shock, bankers sell o¤ both
these good and bad securities by bundling them together as mutual funds with a pretence of
a liquidity crunch. On the receiving end, household/shareholder cannot distinguish whether
such a sale is triggered by the wake of bad news about the project outcomes or due to liquidity
shortage su¤ered by the banks. Our paper shows that the perfect consumption risk sharing in
the universal banking system breaks down due to this conict of interests stemming from private
information. This leads to: (i) a sharp discount in the price of stocks underwritten by banks,
(ii) greater precautionary motive by households for holding more deposit, (iii) loan pushing by
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the banks.1
A novelty of our paper is that we investigate the impact of such information friction not
only on the pricing of securities but also on commercial banking activities of the universal banks
which comprise the volume of lending and the magnitude of depository activities. In addition,
we also analyze the real output and welfare e¤ects of such a conict of interest. We show that
the conict of interest that manifests in terms of information friction has potentially harmful
real e¤ects on the aggregate economy.
Our stylized model provides insights about the chain reaction caused by the information
friction in the universal banking system. First, as rational investors solve a signal extraction
problem by assigning a probability that banks might be selling lemons, such securities sell at
a discount. The model simulation suggests that this discount is quantitatively substantial and
it depends on the probability of a sale of lemon imputed by investors. Second, the immediate
e¤ect of this sale of lemon securities disrupts the perfect risk sharing arrangements obtained
under full information. This happens because losses incurred by the investors from buying
a probable lemon security even at a discount are not fully compensated at the margin when
securities turn out to be good. The unevenness in investors income causes increased volatility
in consumption across states of nature which inicts a welfare loss on households. Third, to
mitigate this consumption risk, households undertake more savings resulting in an increased
volume of bank deposits. Fourth, banks make extra prot from selling lemon stocks which is
channelled (via their balance sheet) towards greater loan pushing to households. Finally, the
e¤ect of holding and trading nancial claims upon information spills over to both investment
and commercial banking activities. This contributes to a decline in the aggregate investment
and output because of a higher market interest rate.
The US experiences in the wake of the nancial crisis and its aftermath are broadly in line
with the predictions of our model. Commercial banking activities showed a spurt after 2004.
During 2004Q1-2008Q4, the quarterly savings deposit:GDP ratio rose from 20.6% to 30% while
the quarterly commercial and industrial loans also showed an increase from about 7.6% of GDP
in 2004 to 11.3% until the onset of the credit crunch. This increase in commercial banking
activity was accompanied by a sharp drop in the quarterly GDP growth rate from 1.5% to
1 In this paper, the sole focus is on the e¤ect of lenders moral hazard problem on the stock market in the
presence of information friction. In a separate paper, Banerji and Basu (2015) deal with the borrowers moral
hazard problem.
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-0.2% and about a 30% decline in the real S&P index.2
Our paper does not aim to provide an explanation of the nancial crisis because we do
not model the bankers bankruptcy due to liquidity shock which is an important feature of
the nancial crisis. Nevertheless, our model provides useful insights about the tremendous risk
taking incentive of the universal banks. An implication of our model is that the universal banking
system could have possibly contributed to the crisis only to the extent that bankers had hidden
information about the borrowing rms. This might have led to the lemon problem in the stock
market that Akerlof and Shiller (12015) call a "phishing equilibrium". How much information
was actually hidden in the banking system is an empirical question which is beyond the scope
of this paper.
The policy implication of our model is that a universal banking system could work e¢ ciently
if there is full disclosure of negative information. A punitive tax on banks could moderate the
lemon problem due to information friction and lower the consumption risk of the households.
However, such a tax entails some e¢ ciency loss because the enforcement authority su¤ers from
the same information friction as private citizens. Thus, it poses a burden on all banks regardless
of their deviant status. In addition, our model also implies that in the presence of informational
friction, even scrupulous rating agencies could make mistakes in rating securities because they
face the same signal extraction problem as the household.
The issue still remains whether an e¤ective "ring fencing" as suggested by the Independent
Banking Commission in 2011 could perform better than the universal banking system. We show
that an articial separation between retail and investment banking in a "ring-fenced" system
gives rise to a rst order welfare loss due to lack of diversication opportunities. As a result,
e¢ cient consumption risk sharing breaks down when such "ring fencing" is implemented. The
result is robust even when we allow for hidden information in the universal banking arrangement.
The paper is organized as follows. The following section is devoted to review the related
literature on universal banking. Section 3 lays out the model and the environment. Section 4
solves a baseline model of universal banking with full information about states of nature. Section
5 introduces asymmetric information about the states and the consequent conict of interest
between banks and the stockholders. Section 6 reports results from a simulation experiment
based on our model to test robustness of the key results when interest rate is endogenized. In
2These data are reported from the quarterly database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. The S&P
indiex is deated by the CPI (all items) to arrive at the real stock price index comparable to our model.
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section 7, we report the results of a policy experiment when the government imposes a punitive
tax on banks to ameliorate the lemon problem. Section 8 reports results of the comparison
between universal banking and stand-alone banking systems. Section 9 concludes.
II. Background and Literature Review
Our paper contributes to the debate on the e¢ cacy of the universal banking system vis-a-vis
retail or stand-alone banking system. Investment banking activity primarily deals with the ac-
tivity of underwriting of securities while retail banking engages in the business of taking deposits
and making loans. Following the great depression in the US, the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 sep-
arated these two activities. Consequently, nancial intermediaries could not participate in both
equity and bond markets. A series of nancial reforms, starting in the late 80s and culminating
in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 nally ended this separation between commercial and
investment banking. This banking integration was envisaged to carry out e¢ cient risk sharing
in the nancial services markets. Benston (1990,1994), Barth et al. (2000), Krozner and Rajan
(1994, 1997), Puri (1996), Gande et. al (1997), Stiglitz (2009) among many others contributed
to this lively debate in the 90s.
In the aftermath of the nancial crisis, universal banking arrangement started losing its
virtues. There was widespread speculation that the integrated system posed greater risks for
households because too much private information was held by a unied nancial system to the
detriment of the households. The regulators in the UK and the USA started contemplating
to curb multifarious activities of these institutions, especially in areas where commercial banks
entered the business of underwriting equities. In 2011, an independent commission on banking
chaired by Sir John Vickers made a comprehensive assessment of the extant universal banks and
suggested protective a ring-fencearound their high street banking activities. The UK banks
are expected to implement these reforms no later than 2019.3
The extant literature on universal banking covers di¤erent features of the universal banking
system which includes certication e¤ects or economies of scope or transmission of information
to outsiders. For example, Kanatas and Qi (1998, 2003) discuss the trade-o¤ between economies
of scope embedded within universal banking versus deteriorations of quality of projects and
innovations. Puri (1996, 1999) focuses on the added role of certication of banks while under-
3See Financial Times (21 December, 2012 and April 21, 2011). See also Guardian (12 September, 2011).
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writing debt securities versus conicts of interests in equity holding. Rajan (2002) analyzes the
e¢ ciency of universal banking related to competitiveness of the institutions.
Our model has direct or indirect relevance to this large volume of literature on universal
banking. However, our stylized model focuses primarily on the information friction endemic to
the universal banking system. The building block of our framework is the traditional model of
banking in which nancial intermediaries transform riskier loans made to individuals to relatively
safer deposits by holding a diversied portfolio of loans to many projects with uncorrelated risks.
The model in this sense builds on Azariadis (1993, page 238-244), Bhattacharya and Thakor
(1993) and Diamond (1984) and Gurley and Shaw (1960). We embed optimal nancial contracts
into this traditional model of banking where banks hold both deposits and tradable nancial
securities of their client rms. We follow this approach to grasp the additional mileage of the
universal banking over standard framework of intermediation that focuses on economies of scale
or scope associated with such banking system. Our paper is closer in spirit to the recent analysis
of conict of interest in other areas of nancial services industry rooted in the informational
problems.4
Our paper also connects to a thread of literature that evaluates whether bank regulations
and supervisions could be welfare improving. Kilinc and Neyapati (2012) set up a general
equilibrium model and argue that regulation has positive output and welfare e¤ects if it reduces
adverse selection and moral hazard problem. However, they focus mostly on borrowers moral
hazard problem while in this paper our centre of attention is the adverse selection due to lenders
superior information. Tchana (2012) brings banking regulations in an overlapping generations
model and demonstrates the trade-o¤ between banking stability and economic growth. In our
model, the loss of output and welfare primarily results from the conict of interest between
universal bankers and the shareholders due to hidden information. We argue that an attempt to
eliminate this information friction by punitive tax could have mixed e¤ects. While investment
and output could rise due to contrived decline in interest rate, aggregate welfare could fall
because of a blanket tax on prots of each bank regardless of its deviant status. On the other
hand, if the bank regulation takes the form of "ring-fencing" the banking sector, it could have
a rst order welfare loss due to the loss of diversication opportunities of the households.
Our paper has indirect implications for an emerging debate about the role of rating agencies
4See Mehran and Stultz (2007) (and other papers in the volume) for a comprehensive analysis of such conicts
pertinent to nancial services industry originating from asymmetry of information.
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in accentuating the nancial crisis. Akerlof and Shiller (2015) argue that well known rating
agencies did not justiably rate the new security issuance because of conict of interest with
the investment banks. Hill (2010), however, does not entirely subscribe to this conventional
view. He argues that these rating agencies were overwhelmed by the increasing complexity of
securitization. In terms of our model, we subscribe to Hills view. The rating agencies also
succumbed to the same informational asymmetry problems as the ordinary shareholders.
III. The Model
A. Households
We consider a simple intertemporal general equilibrium model in which there is a continuum of
identical agents in the unit interval who live only for two periods. At t = 1, a stand-in agent is
endowed with y units of consumption goods, and she also undertakes a physical investment of
k units of capital in the current period which produces a random cash ow/output in the next
period. Since the households initial endowment is insu¢ cient to nance such an investment,
the household approaches a bank for nancing its project. The nancing bank basically owns
equity claims to the project which means that the household is contractually bound to pay a
state contingent cash ow net of dividend to the bank. The exact design of the contract will be
specied later.
The bank manages the production of nal goods by delegating it to a nonnancial rm who
has no relations to the household. The production of output is subject to two types of binary
shocks: (i) an aggregate shock, (ii) an idiosyncratic shock. The aggregate shock is transmitted
to intermediaries/agents via a probabilistic signal. A signal conveys news about the state which
could be high (h) and low (l) with probabilities h and 1   h respectively. A low signal (a
recessionary state) triggers widespread liquidation of the current projects and the project is
liquidated at a near zero continuation value (m).5 If the signal is h; agents are still subject to
idiosyncratic shock which manifests in terms of a project success which means that output is
gg(k) with probability p and failure meaning output equal to bg(k) with probability 1   p
where g > b:6
5This assumption is made in order to preserve a simple structure for analysis. Instead of assuming a xed
salvage value, we could have alternatively proceeded with a lower probability of success in individual projects in
the event of a low aggregative signal and this would not change our results.
6Since this type of risk is distributed independently across innite number of projects, the law of large number
holds in an economy populated by continuum of agents so that p fraction of individuals is more successful than
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To sum up, the random output in next period has the following representation:
m with probability 1  h
gg(k) with probability hp
bg(k) with probability h(1  p)
B. Banks
In the same spirit as in Azariadis and Smith (1993) and Hart (1995), competitive banks o¤er a
menu contracts to the households as follows. At date 1, competitive universal banks o¤er an ex
ante contract that stipulates: (i) deposits (s), (ii) loans (f), and (iii) contingent payments (di;
i = g; b). After writing such a contract and before the realization of the random shock, banks
may experience a liquidity shock (C) which necessitates banks to sell their ownerships claims
(ig(k)   di) to the public in a secondary market at a price q.7 Let N be the number of such
securities. Let x and nx denote the states of liquidity shock and no such shock with probabilities
1   and : This interim period when the secondary market opens is dated as 1:5.8
At this interim date 1.5, the bank may also acquire an early signal about the aggregate shock.
If the signal is high (h) with probability h, the projects value upon continuation is greater
than the same under liquidation. If the signal is low, it means that banks get early information
that most of the projects will turn out to be a lemon with a negligible value m (close to zero).9
At t = 2, uncertainties get resolved and all agents receive pay-o¤ according to the contracts
written at date t = 1, which, in turn, depends on (a) resolution of individual uncertainty and
the rest. On the other hand, no such law holds for a low aggregate state.
7We only allow the banks to have a liquidity shock and exclude individuals to have similar problem because it
makes the exposition simpler and also owing to the fact that the primary purpose of the paper is to investigate the
consequence of banksholding of tradable nancial assets on the rest of the economy under both full information
and asymmetric information. In particular, we show later how the private information gathered by banks regarding
the aggregate state has both nancial and real e¤ects.
8Under universal banking, banks or intermediaries can hold securities which are otherwise unrestricted and
tradable compared with the system where banks can only hold debt securities which cannot easily be traded in
the nancial/debt market.
9The rationale behind such assumption is that since banks lend and monitor a large number of projects across
the economy, they gather expertise to collect information relevant not only to a single project but can extract
information about the overall economy better than the households. This is a standard function of banks who
are also known as informed lenders(see Freixas and Rochet, 2008). However, the main di¤erence between the
universal and non universal banking is that the former can take its informational advantage by selling stocks to
others before the bad event realizes while the latter cannot do such things because they are not allowed to hold
equity in the borrowing rms.
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(b) occurrences of liquidity shocks of banks. The Figure 1 summarizes the timeline in terms of
a ow chart assuming that households and banks have symmetric information about the timing
of shocks.
<Figure 1: Timeline of Universal Banking under Symmetric Information>
The expected prot of the bank is thus:
bank = h:[pfgg(k)  dgg+ (1  p):fbg(k)  dbg]
+h(1  ):(qN   C)
+(1  h)m  f:(1 + rh)
(1)
The banks expected prot function is standard and it is borrowed from the optimal contract
literature (see for example, Frexias and Rochet, 2008). The expected prot takes into account
that the universal bank is an equity holder of the project that it nances. The rst square bracket
term is the expected cash ow that the bank receives in a high signal (h) and no liquidity shock
(nx) state. The second term is the expected cash ow from selling shares in the secondary
market net of the liquidity shock when the bank experiences liquidity shock in a high state. The
third term is the expected payo¤ when the bank liquidates the project in a low aggregate state.
Notice that the last term involving the loan (f) plus its service cost (rh) is a negative payo¤ to
the bank because it is disbursed to the household. The loan servicing cost is rh because banks
do not pay any interest on savings in a low signal state which occurs with probability 1 h. For
analytical simplicity we assume until section 6 that the loan interest rate is outside the realm
of this contract and is xed exogenously. In section 6, we analyze the case when interest rate is
endogenous and determined by the loan market clearing condition. Hereafter, we also assume
that banks issue just enough shares to cover the liquidity crunch which means N = C=q:10
A few more comments are in order to justify the existence of multiple shocks in the model.
The presence of idiosyncratic shocks to individual projects induce banks and individuals to
allocate risk optimally among themselves. Banks divide ownership claims in the borrowing
rms between themselves and the household/shareholders which is a typical feature of universal
banking. This division of ownership serves as a mechanism for risk sharing with the households.
Second, the introduction of liquidity shock by banks directly provides rationale for banks selling
10 In fact, when information friction is present (which we deal in the later section), it is not incentive compatible
for any bank to issue more shares such that qN > c: If a bank does so, it will be labelled as a deviant bank by
the investors.
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stocks to investors in the secondary market at date 1.5 when the bank could receive bad news
about the project and sell such lemon stocks with a pretence of a liquidity shock. We deal with
such a scenario of asymmetric information in section 5. Finally, the aggregate shock also provides
a rationale for households to hold claims in the form of bank deposits (i.e., demand deposits
in addition to holding nancial claims via optimal contracts). Households saving also provides
liquidity to the stock market when it opens at the intermediate date 1.5. Saving thus performs
two roles: (i) consumption smoothing, and (ii) liquidity for speculative purchase of shares.
All banks are competitive and in equilibrium a zero prot condition holds. However, each
generic bank o¤ers a menu of contacts which includes loan (f), investment (k), dividend payment
(dg; df ) which maximize the expected utility of a stand-in household to which we now turn.
Since a bank delegates the production decision to a competitive rm who has no relationship
to the household, the latter does not see the rm specic shocks. This separation preserves the
information friction problem that we spell out later.11
C. Preferences
The utility function of each household/ borrower/depositor is additively separable in consump-
tion at each date and is of the form:
U = u(c1) + v(c2) (2)
where ct= consumption at date t, where t = 1; 2, u() and v() are: (a) three times continuously
di¤erentiable, (b) concave, and (c) have a convex marginal utility function. Hence, agents are
risk-averse and in addition, they have a precautionary motive for savings.
Apart from the current period, in period 2 there are 5 possible states and the expected utility
of an agent from consumption that occur in all such contingencies is given by:
EU = [u(c1) + hfpv(cnx2g ) + (1  p)v(cnx2b )g
+h(1  )fpv(cx2g) + (1  p)v(cx2bg] (3)
+(1  h)u(c2l)
11The issue remains why in a universal banking environment it is incentive compatible for the household to get
involved in such contingent payment contract with the banks. We do not explicitly model this. We implicitly
assume that the household needs to incur a xed cost of running its own production establishment which makes
its expected payo¤ lower compared to a contingency payments arrangement.
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The superscripts x and nx stand for liquidity or no liquidity shock for banks12 and the
subscript 2g and 2b stand for good and bad project outcomes (idiosyncratic shocks) at date 2
with the good news about aggregate shock (subscript h) and the subscript l refers to the low
aggregate state. The other notations are as follows:
 c1 = consumption of the agent in the rst period.
 cnx2j = consumption of the agent in the period 2 when the banks with high aggregate signal
do not su¤er liquidity shock (nx) and the individual state is j = g or b , which means that
the cash ow is jg(k):
 In a similar vein, cx2j = consumption of the agent in the period 2 when the banks with a
high signal su¤er liquidity shock (x) and the individual state is j:
 c2l = consumption of the agent when the bank has received a low signal and face liquidation
of the project.
The rst term, u(c1) in (3) is the utility from current consumption. The term hfpv(cnx2g )+
(1   p)v(cnx2b )g is the probability weighted utility when the aggregate news is good but banks
do not su¤er liquidity shock. Similarly, the term h(1   )fpv(cx2g) + (1   p)v(cx2b)g is the
probability weighted utility in a good aggregate state when banks su¤er liquidity shock. The
nal term (1   h)u(c2l), is the weighted utility in the bad aggregate state when banks do not
pay interest to depositors.
D. Budget Constraints
The budget constraint in period 1 and all ve contingencies in period 2 are:
c1 = y + f   s  k (4)
cnx2g = dg + s(1 + r) (5)
cnx2b = db + s(1 + r) (6)
cx2g = dg + (s  z)(1 + r) +
z
q
E ~X (7)
cx2b = db + (s  z)(1 + r) +
z
q
E ~X (8)
c2l = s  z (9)
12Although individuals do not su¤er any liquidity shock, banks state of liquidity matter to them because it
determines the state whether they will participate in the stock market or not.
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where
 
 = pg + (1  p)b;
 
d = pdg + (1  p)db , E ~X =
 
g(K) 
 
d and K = the average capital
stock in the economy.
The equation (4) is the rst period budget constraint which states that consumption of
an agent is equal to endowment y plus the fund received from bank f less the money stored
as deposit s and expenditure on capital good k.13 The equations (5) and (6) capture agents
consumption (equal to income) in the good and bad states of production respectively when
banks do not su¤er any liquidity shocks. In these states of nature, individuals do not participate
in the stock market in the intermediate period. In such states, the agents income consists of
two parts: (i) the contingent payments di depending on the state of production, (i = g; b), (ii)
the principal and the interest income on deposits s(1 + r) .
Equations (7) and (8) are the state dependent budget constraints when banks encounter
liquidity shock and the project can be a success (g) or failure (b). When the household member
invests z in stocks at a unit price q; it entitles him a claim of zqE
~X units of goods because the
bank sells a mutual fund to the household bundling good and bad shares.14 An atomistic bank
while stipulating an optimal contract for an atomistic household takes the average variables, K
and
 
d as given. However, in equilibrium these two average variables are determined by aggregate
consistency conditions.
Equation (9) shows that when the bank receives a bad news (state l) about the economy,
the project is liquidated and the banks receive the liquidation value as it has the rst priority
over claims. Recall that in such a low signal state (which is a state of macroeconomic shock),
banks are unable to make full payment and only return the deposits s to the households.15
IV. Universal Banking under Full Information
As a baseline case, we rst lay out the equilibrium contract in a full information scenario.
For a given interest rate r and stock price q, each bank o¤ers a package to the household which
includes (i) the loan size f , (ii) payments to the same household di contingent on realizations
of idiosyncratic states. In return, the household must put in a deposit s at the same bank and
13The endowment y is dened as net of the foreign interest paid or received from abroad. See the appendix
outlining the equilibrium section for details.
14A bank lends out to innitely many people. Hence, an individual over a unit interval, when buys one such
banks mutual fund receives a payment of
 
pg+(1  p)b

g(K) 
 
d per share.
15Nothing fundamentally changes in our model if we assume instead that banks return only a fraction of savings
in a low aggregate state.
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undertake a physical investment k in the project. Such a package is stipulated by the bank that
solves the expected utility of the household subject to the condition that these universal banks
o¤ering such competitive contracts satisfy the participation constraint which means that they
must break even.
The optimal contract facing the household is to maximize the expected utility (3) subject to
the budget constraints given by (4) through (9) and zero prot constraint of the intermediary,
i.e.
bank = h [pfgg(k)  dgg+ (1  p)fbg(k)  dbg]+(1 h)m+h(1 )(qN C) f:(1+rh)  0
Since there is full information, the agent exactly knows the node at which the bank operates.
Thus at a low signal state agents know that a stock market will not open at date 1:5. This
immediately means that z = 0 at this low signal state.
As a baseline case, we assume that the real interest rate, r is xed by a policy rule. Any
discrepancy between borrowing f and lending s is nanced by a net inow of foreign funds (call
it NFI) from abroad at this xed interest rate.16The Appendix A provides the details of the
market clearing conditions.
Proposition 1: The competitive equilibrium contract has the following properties:
(i) Contingent Payments: dg = db = d (say) such that
u0(c1)
1+rh
= v0(d+ s(1 + r))
(ii) Share Price: q = E
~X
1+r where E
~X =
 
g(K) 
 
d
N :
(iii) Consumption: cnx2g = c
nx
2b = c
x
2g = c
x
2b = d+ s(1 + r) = c2(say) > c2l = s
(iv) Saving: u0(c1) =
h
(1 h)(1+rh)
1 h+rh(1 )
i
v0(s)
(v) Investment: h
 
 g0(k) = 1 + rh where
 
 = pg + (1  p)b and
(vi) Loan: f = h(
 
g(k) d)+(1 h)m+h(1 )(qN C)
1+rh
(vii) Consistency of Expectations: k = K
Proof : Appendix B.
Discussion: (i), (iv), (v) and (vi) together determine fd; s;K; f g and the equation (ii)
determines q; given an exogenous r. Stocks have fair market value as seen in (ii) and the
risk premium is thus zero. The risk neutral bank bears the whole idiosyncratic risks which
16This assumption is made for analytical simplicity because it rules out the second order e¤ect of the nancial
operations of banks and households on the real interest rate. In section 6 where we undertake model simulation,
we allow the interest rate to vary to equilibrate the loan market.
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explains why the market risk premium is zero. (i) and (ii) together state that conditional on
the realization of high signal, an agent receives a constant sum d across all states of nature.
Although idiosyncratic risk is washed out in the high state h, in the low state individuals are
still exposed to negative aggregate shock which explains the last inequality of (iii). The holding
of deposit in the form of savings acts as an instrument to deal with this situation. If there is no
aggregate risk, h = 1, optimal saving is zero as seen from (iv) which highlights the precautionary
motive for savings. (v) states that the expected marginal productivity of investment equals the
risk adjusted interest rate, 1 + hr. The physical investment k is lower if the probability of
low aggregate state is higher (lower h) or the probability of liquidity shock is higher (lower
). In the latter case, banks may cut back lending and hold less equity stake due to looming
insolvency17. (vi) states the equilibrium loan size obtained from banks zero prot condition.
Finally, (vii) states the aggregate consistency condition that sum of all individual capital stocks
equals the aggregate capital and over a unit interval.
The results in the proposition 1 serve to capture the basic functioning of the universal
banking in the simplest possible full information framework. The universal banks optimally
share project risks by o¤ering a riskfree payment d and the residual jg(k)   d is kept by the
bank.18 Without any conicts of interest (asymmetric information), this is a Pareto optimal
contract. It eliminates idiosyncratic uncertainties in household consumption and makes stock
price trade at a fair market value.
V. Universal Banking under Asymmetric Information
Using the baseline model of full information described in the preceding section, we now turn
to the case of asymmetric information. The basic tenet of such informational asymmetry is
that banks hold private information about the realization of the aggregate business cycle as well
the liquidity shocks.19 In other words, banks observe true realizations of both liquidity shocks
17 In the simulation experiment reported in Table 3 later this conjecture is conrmed.
18This contract is equivalent to: (i) agents holding a preferred stock (or any other instrument that ensures a
constant sum in all contingencies within good aggregate state), and (ii) banks owning ordinary stocks and thus
bear all the residual risks. Thus, banks holding of equity, a hallmark of universal banking, emerges as a mechanism
of an optimum allocation of risk.
19The banks can observe the aggregate shock at least in a partial manner because they lend it to agents
economy-wide and collect/collate information from each borrower. Hence, they tend to have economy-wide
information while each agent is too small to acquire aggregate signal. However, banks signal about aggregate
and idiosyncratic shocks need not be perfect and could be even noisy. For the sake of parsimony, simplicity, and
without compromising our results below, we ignore the noisiness of banks signal about aggregate shock and their
private information about individual projects.
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and the realization of the signal regarding the macro business cycle state but agents know
only the distribution of liquidity shocks and the signals. Since interest payment on deposits
and liquidation of projects in a bad aggregate state take place at t = 2 after the transaction
in intermediate stock market, if the stock market opens at date 1:5, agents cannot ascertain
whether banks have received a low signal or simply su¤ered a liquidity shock. The information
friction is further aggravated by the fact that household is separated from the rm undertaking
production decisions. This gives rise to a typical lemon problem because universal banks with
a low realization of the signal may sell o¤ the equity held by them in the borrowing rm with
a pretence of the liquidity shock. This problem of selling lemon stocks can emerge only in the
universal banking system as opposed to the non universal system where banks are barred from
holding equities in the borrowing rms.
Figure 2 summarizes the timeline of universal banking in the presence of asymmetric infor-
mation. The only di¤erence from Figure 1 is the dotted line at the node t = 1:5 which represents
the fact that the agent cannot ascertain at this node whether the bank has su¤ered a liquidity
shock or has received a low aggregate signal or both. At this node, she only observes whether
the stock market has opened or not. If the stock market does not open then she knows for sure
(a) high signal has occurred and (b) no bank has su¤ered a liquidity shock. Of course, she could
still either succeed or fail. Given that (a) and (b) happen with probability h, the expected
utility (up to this node) is:
h[pv(dg + s(1 + r)) + (1  p)v(db + s(1 + r))]:
If the equity market opens at the intermediate date 1.5 where a nancial intermediary sells
stocks, an agent concludes that either the bank has received a low signal (with a probability of
1  h) or the bank has received good news about the aggregate shock but it is still selling the
stock because it has su¤ered a liquidity shock. The probability of the latter event is h(1  ).
Hence, an individual at the node at date 1.5 when she is observing someone selling the stocks
will impute the probability

h(1 )
h(1 )+(1 h) =
h(1 )
(1 h)

that the stock is not a lemon. The model
thus portrays a situation where banks lend money to its borrowers and also hold other tradable
nancial claims on them. Hence, our model is rich to capture a scenario whereby a bank can
sell o¤ lemon securities to investors when it has private information about bad project state
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underlying these securities, enabling it to recover some of its lending losses.
<Figure 2: Timeline of Universal Banking under Asymmetric Information>
Dene EUa as the expected utility in the presence of information friction. The optimal
contract problem can be thus written as:
max
fdg ;db;s;z;l;kg
EUa = [u(y + f   s  k)] + h[pv(dg + s(1 + r)) + (1  p)v(db + s(1 + r))]
+(1  h) 

(h(1 )
(1 h)

)[pv(dg + (s  z)(1 + r) + zqE ~X)
+(1  p)v(db + (s  z)(1 + r) + zqE ~X)]
+(1  h)

(1 h)
(1 h)

v(s  z)
(10)
subject to
banka = h [pfgg(k)  dgg+ (1  p)fbg(k)  dbg]+h(1 )(qN C)+(1 h)(qN+m) f(1+rh)  0
(11)
There are two important features of this optimal contract problem which require clarication.
First, while writing a contract with the bank, household/shareholder takes into account that
banks can sell o¤ stocks in the midway (at date 1.5) in the wake of bad news and thus they
may incur capital losses. Second, the zero prot constraint (11) now contains an additional term
(1   h)qN which is the extra expected income of the banks from selling securities upon bad
news.
Proposition 2: The equilibrium contract under asymmetric information has the following
properties:
(ia) Contingent Payments: dga = dba = da (say) and
u0(c1)
1+rh
= v0(cnx2a ) + (1  )v0(cx2a)
(iia) Share Price: E
~Xa
q   (1 + r) =
0@ v0f(sa z)g
v0

da+(sa z)(1+r)+ zqE
~
X

1A 1 h
h(1 ) > 0 where E
~Xa
=
 
g(K) 
 
da
(iiia) Consumption: cx2g = c
x
2b  cx2a = da + sa(1 + r) +
n
E ~Xa
q   (1 + r)
o
z > cnx2g = c
nx
2b =
cnx2a (say) = da + sa(1 + r) > cla = sa   z
(iva) Saving: u0(c1a) =
h
(1 h)(1+rh)
1 h+rh(1 )
i
v0(sa   z)
(va) Investment: h
 
 g0(k) = 1 + rh where
 
 = ph + (1  p)l and
(via) Loan: fa =
h(
 
g(k) da)+(1 h)(qN+m)+h(1 )(qN C)
1+rh
(viia) Consistency of Expectations: k = K
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Proof : Appendix B.
Discussions: We denote the subscript a as the solution of the variables under asymmetric
information. (ia) shares the same feature as (i). Idiosyncratic risks are again borne by the risk
neutral bank and household receives a riskfree payment da for its ownership claim to the project.
The major di¤erence from the baseline full information setting appears in (iia). Since banks
can potentially sell lemon securities in the midway at date 1.5, the optimal contract embeds
this possibility. (iia) shows that stocks sell at a discount in the sense that the price is less than
the discounted value of the cash ow. To put it alternatively, a positive market risk premium
emerges in equilibrium to reect this lemon problem.
The intuition for (iia) goes as follows. If a household spends one unit to buy stock from a
bank, the marginal utility gain is:
v0

da + (s  z)(1 + r) + z
q
EX
(
E ~X
q
  (1 + r)
)
which happens with the probability, h(1  ) that he buys stocks from a good bank su¤ering
from a liquidity shock. On the other hand, the marginal cost is that if the purchased stock is
a lemon, then he loses out on his savings and consequent marginal utility loss is v0f(s   z)g
which happens with probability (1   h). The equivalence between the marginal gain and loss
in investing in stocks explains that the stocks are selling at a discount (or equivalently the
emergence of risk premium) as shown in the equation (iia). Everything else equal, the greater
the ratio of 1 hh(1 )(relative proportion of lemon), the lower the price of the stock.
The immediate implication of stocks selling at a discount is captured in proposition (iiia)
which shows that the consumption ows of households are smoothed out only partially when
banks sell their ownership claims upon bad news. The consumption in the states where house-
holds participate in the stock market exceeds the consumption in states where they do not.
(iva) and (va) are the usual rst order conditions for saving and investment. (via) shows the
equilibrium loan size based on the zero prot constraint that binds at the optimum.20
Comparison with the full information baseline reveals that the stock market risk premium
arises purely due to information friction. Since shareholders are unable to ascertain whether
banks sell o¤ shares due to liquidity shock or arrival of bad news, additional premium is required
20The description of overall equilibrium is omitted as they mirror conditions laid out in the appendix, except
that the variables now refer to the asymmetric information case.
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to lure households to buy shares. The emergence of a risk premium (or stocks selling at a
discount) prevents the agents from smoothing out consumption across nx and x states. In sharp
contrast, a full insurance across nx and x is possible under full information setting because
agents are perfectly informed about the nodes at which banks sell stocks.
The sale of stocks at a discount ex post, certainly changes the structure of contracts between
banks and the borrowing households and it a¤ects investment and commercial banking directly.
The following proposition makes it evident.
Proposition 3: (i) d > da; (ii) s < sa; (iii) f < fa:
Proof: Appendix C.
Since s < sa and f < fa, the immediate implication is that the equilibrium loan size is
higher under asymmetric information. From (iii) and (iiia), it follows that the spread between
the expected consumption in the high and low aggregate signals under adverse selection is greater
than under full information.
The intuitive reasonings of the above results are as follows. Since risk averse households take
greater risks in the equity market than before due to possibilities of buying lemons, they are
compensated by lower equity stake in production, implying d > da. The additional risks of losing
their investment in the bad aggregate state makes marginal utility of households in that state
even higher. This prompts households to make more deposits at the bank for precautionary
purposes. Finally, the loan size increases because banks make more prot from both equity
holding (
 
g(k)  
 
da) and trading shares ((1   h)qN), which lure more competitive banks to
enter the commercial banking industry. The end result is that the size of the commercial
banking activity in the form of loans and deposits expands under asymmetric information. On
the other hand, this spurt in commercial banking activity also leads to an increased volatility of
households consumption.
Since households bear greater consumption risk in the asymmetric information environment,
it entails welfare loss compared to the full information baseline scenario. In the following propo-
sition, we establish that for a range of interest rates, the expected utility under asymmetric
information (EUa) is less than the baseline full formation expected utility (EU).
Proposition 4: EU > EUa
Proof: Appendix E.
A few comments are in order before concluding this section. When banks sell stocks upon
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news, there is a redistributive element where banks receive (1  h)C from households (because
in equilibrium, qN = z = C). The ine¢ ciency is thus rooted in two elements: q is traded at
a discount ( proposition 2) and an increase in precautionary savings (s) (proposition 3). Both
lead to a loss of welfare manifested in greater consumption risk (proposition 2). Here, a tax on
trading could partially ameliorate this welfare loss which we deal in section 7.21
VI. Endogenous Interest Rate
The analytical results in propositions 2 and 3 are established in the neighborhood of a full
information equilibrium and also with an assumption of a small open economy which means that
the real interest rate is exogenous. In this section, we perform a simulation experiment to check
the robustness of these results. Assume logarithmic utility functions which means: u(c1) = ln c1
and v(c2) = ln c2: The production function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas, meaning g(k) = k
with 0 <  < 1. The interest rate (r) is now determined by the loan market equilibrium
condition, s = f: There are nine parameters in this stylized model, namely y; h; ; p; ; g,
b; C and m: The rst period output y is normalized at unity with a view to express relevant
macroeconomic aggregates as a fraction of the rst period output (GDP). The average growth
rate of the economy is then h
 
k + (1  h)m.22 After xing the capital share parameter  at
its conventional value 0.36, the remaining parameters are xed to target the average quarterly
growth rate of GDP in the US and a real interest rate of 4.62% (computed by subtracting the
bank prime rate from the CPI rate of ination) during the crisis period 2004Q1-2008Q4.23 The
Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis database is used to arrive at these summary measures for
output growth and real interest rate. Table 1 summarizes the baseline parameter values.
Table 1: Baseline Parameters
 y b g h  p m C
0.36 1.00 1.00 2.25 0.92 0.766 0.6 0.05 0.1
Table 2 compares two economies: (i) with symmetric information (Symm Info), (ii) with
21One has to take into account that such a tax also penalizes the honest banks who sell due to adverse liquidity.
An optimal tax can be designed which is beyond the scope of this paper.
22 In the context of our two period model, the ratio of the second period to rst period outputs approximates
the long run average GDP growth rate.
23Given the stylized nature of this two period model, we do not aim to fully calibrate our model economy.
The goal of this simulation is rather to illustrate the comparative statics e¤ects on relevant aggregates setting
parameters at reasonable values. These comparative statics results are reasonably robust to alternative choice of
parameter values.
19
asymmetric information (Asymm Info) for di¤erent probabilities of low signal states (1  h).
The appendix describes the key equation system and the methodology for this model simulation.
The lemon e¤ect on the stock market is reected by a sharply lower stock price (q) in the economy
with information friction and a higher consumption volatility (c-vol) measured by the standard
deviation of consumption levels for two dates and states together. In conformity with proposition
3, when information friction is present, banks hold a higher equity stake ( thus lower d=y ) in
the borrowing rms 24 and issue more loans (higher f=y ). While the households also save more
as a precautionary motive, the loan demand far outpaces the supply (f > s) which explains why
the real interest rate rises. A higher interest rate raises the opportunity cost of investment (see
equations v and va in propositions 1 and 2) and has an adverse output e¤ect.25 Consumption
volatility is higher when information friction is present. Notice also that a greater probability
of a low aggregate state (higher 1  h) simply magnies all these e¤ects. All these results are
in conformity with propositions 2 and 3.
Table 2: E¤ect of a change in the probability of low signal state
h q d=y f=y r(%) output effect c volatility
0.92
Symm Info
Asymm Info
0:27
0:13
0:79
0:64
0:20
0:30
4:56%
5:12%
 0:27% 0:41
0:46
0.91
Symm Info
Asymm Info
0:30
0:13
0:76
0:62
0:22
0:32
3:4%
4:04%
 0:31% 0:39
0:45
0.90
Symm Info
Asymm Info
0:34
0:12
0:74
0:59
0:24
0:34
2:22%
2:93%
 0:35% 0:38
0:44
In Table 3, we perform similar sensitivity analysis by varying the probability (1  ) of the
liquidity crisis state. The e¤ect of information friction is again the same as in propositions 2
and 3. A greater probability of a liquidity crisis (lower ) heightens the speculative motive
of households for saving which lowers the interest rate in both economies with or without in-
formation friction. Banks keep a lower equity stake and also push less loans in response to a
greater anticipation of a liquidity crisis because of the looming insolvency. The output e¤ects
of information friction is insensitive to change in  and so is the consumption volatility. 26
24Note that banks equity share is simply {1  (d=y)}100%:
25The adverse output e¤ect of information friction, however, depends on the risk aversion parameter. We have
specialized to a log utility function which means the relative risk aversion parameter is unity. For a more general
power utility function, a higher relative risk aversion parameter entails greater precautionary savings which might
reverse the direction of the output e¤ect because the supply of loans could then outpace the demand.
26The e¤ect of a change in p is not reported here for brevity. Such a change in project risk has very little
e¤ects on the economy except the loan size and contingent payments. In response to a higher project downside
risk (lower p); banks cut back loans (f) and contingent payments (d) to the borrowers signicantly.
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Table 3: E¤ect of a change in the probability of liquidity crisis
 q d=y f=y r (%) output effect c volatility
0:766
Symm Info
Asymm Info
0:27
0:13
0:79
0:64
0:20
0:30
4:56%
5:12%
 0:27% 0:41
0:46
0:75
Symm Info
Asymm Info
0:27
0:13
0:80
0:66
0:19
0:29
2:22%
2:76%
 0:28% 0:41
0:47
0:74
Symm Info
Asymm Info
0:27
0:13
0:81
0:67
0:18
0:28
0:72%
0:12%
 0:28% 0:41
0:47
Table 4 reports the sensitivity analysis of a change in the size of the liquidity shock, C:
While the size of the liquidity shock has negligible consequences for the symmetric information
economy, it has signicant e¤ects on the economy with information frictions. This di¤erence
in e¤ects arises particularly due to the fact that C appears in the banks equilibrium prot
equation (see equation (11)). Banks issue lemon shares with a pretence of a liquidity crunch
and in equilibrium banks can issue shares worth the size of the liquidity shock, C. Thus a
greater size of the liquidity shock provides an incentive to the banks to hold a greater equity
stake in borrowing rms (lower d=y) and push more loans (f=y) because banks make more
prot by selling lemon shares. The equilibrium interest rate in economies with asymmetric
information is higher which reects banks propensity to create more loan demand that far
outpaces the household savings. A higher interest rate has an adverse output e¤ect because
investment responds negatively to interest rate via proposition 2v(a). Consumption volatility in
economies with information friction is signicantly higher when the size of the liquidity shock
is higher. This happens because in the presence of information friction, households equilibrium
consumption in the low signal state (c2l) is s  C which responds negative to a rise in C.
Table 4: E¤ect of a change in the size of the liquidity shock
C q d=y f=y r (%) output effect(%) c volatility
0:1
Symm Info
Asymm Info
0:27
0:13
0:79
0:64
0:20
0:30
4:56%
5:12%
 0:27% 0:41
0:46
0:15
Symm Info
Asymm Info
0:28
0:14
0:79
0:57
0:20
0:35
4:56%
5:4%
 0:41% 0:40
0:53
0:2
Symm Info
Asymm Info
0:28
0:14
0:81
0:50
0:20
0:40
4:56%
5:68%
 0:54% 0:41
0:60
Figures 3 through and 5 summarize the salient features of this sensitivity analysis for a longer
ranges of probabilities and size of the liquidity shocks. In response to a higher probability of low
signal state (1 h), the ratio of stock prices in an asymmetric to symmetric information scenarios
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(denoted as qa=q) declines by nearly 60% while the corresponding consumption volatility ratio
(denoted as cvola=cvol) increases by nearly 48%. A higher probability of liquidity crunch (1 )
has a mixed e¤ect on the same stock price ratio (qa=q) which declines when the probability of
liquidity crunch exceeds 0.35 while a greater size of the liquidity shock (C), however, keeps the
stock price ratio nearly the same but it raises the consumption volatility quite sharply.
<Figure 3: E¤ect of a higher probability of a low signal state>
<Figure 4: E¤ect of a higher probability of a liquidity crunch>
<Figure 5: E¤ect of a higher liquidity shock, C>
A. What drives the stock market discount?
The upshot of this paper is that the information friction due to banks conict of interest
could give rise to a lemon problem which could translate into a stock market discount. The
model predicts that such a discount (measured by the percent change in q from the symmetric
information scenario) could be quite deep. For example, at the baseline parameter values, the
stock market discount is about 52%. The size of the discount is crucially determined by the
relative proportion of lemon in the stock market. Recall that the relative proportion of lemon is
(1 h)=(1 )h which is decreasing in h and increasing in . Thus a higher probability of a low
aggregate state (lower h) and/or a lower probability of liquidity crisis (higher ) heightens this
stock market discount. This results in a higher consumption volatility because investors demand
a larger risk premium on shares. This basically summarizes the rational markets reaction to
the potential lemon problem
VII. Punishment
Suppose the government enforces a punishment in the form of a ne  if banks misbehave. Let
the probability of being caught for such a misbehavior be . The expected prot of the bank
then changes to:
banka = h [pfgg(k)  dgg+ (1  p)fbg(k)  dbg]
+h(1  )(qN   C) + (1  h)[(1  )(qN +m)  )]
 f(1 + rh)
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Table 3 reports the e¤ects of an increase in the ne amount setting the probability of detection
() at 0.5. An increase in the size of penalty has little e¤ect on share prices and banks capital
structure d=f . However, the interest rate sharply falls due to such policy intervention. This
happens because for a given interest rate, a higher penalty lowers the loan size at which the zero
prot condition holds. 27. Since the ne amount  does not directly appear in the rst order
conditions of the household, it has little e¤ect on savings at a given interest rate. The interest
rate, therefore, adjusts downward to equilibrate in response to such a decline in loan demand.
This raises investment and output. This e¤ect is magnied if the ne amount is larger. The
stock market discount due to information friction is also considerably less (40% for a hefty ne
of  = 2 as opposed to 52% when  = 0): Consumption volatility is also lower when the ne
amount is larger. For a su¢ ciently large ne amount (around  = 3), it is possible to replicate
the same consumption volatility as in a symmetric information economy.
Table 5: E¤ect of a change in the size of the ne for bank misbehavious
 q d=y f=y r (%) output effect(%) c volatility EU
0:0
Symm Info
Asymm Info
0:27
0:13
0:79
0:64
0:20
0:30
4:56%
5:12%
 0:27% 0:41
0:46
 0:43
 0:42
0:5
Symm Info
Asymm Info
0:27
0:14
0:79
0:63
0:20
0:29
4:56%
3:31%
0:62%
0:40
0:45
 0:43
 0:45
1:0
Symm Info
Asymm Info
0:27
0:15
0:79
0:61
0:20
0:30
4:56%
1:93%
1:32%
0:40
0:44
 0:43
 0:47
2:0
Symm Info
Asymm Info
0:27
0:16
0:79
0:59
0:20
0:29
4:56%
0:00%
2:75%
0:40
0:42
-0:43
-0:53
Since the policy authority does not know precisely the node at which the bank operates at
date 1.5, it su¤ers from exactly the same information friction as private citizens. The expected
ne amount thus appears as a tax on all banks expected prot regardless of their deviant
behaviour. As a result, the punishment is not costless to the society because it is a deadweight
loss. This decreases welfare of private citizens which appears in the last column of Table 5.
VIII. A comparison with a stand alone banking system
Will private citizens be better o¤ if retails banks are "ring-fenced" and legally mandated not
to underwrite securities? The question is relevant in the present context of banking commissions
27To see this note that in the presence of ne fa =
h(
 
g(k) da)+(1 h)[(qN+m) (1 )]
1+rh
which is lower than
fa as shown in proposition 2 for a given r:
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legislation. Using our model, we now demonstrate that in such a restricted environment when
banks cannot diversify away the liquidity shocks by trading securities, full consumption risk
sharing fails even under full information.
Consider an environment where retail banks and investment banks are separated. Retail
banks only perform loan and depository activities while households mimic the operation of
investment bankers by issuing securities to each other. Banks issue loans (F ) to the house-
hold/entrepreneur and incur the same loan servicing cost as before. As in the previous scenario,
there is a state of a global liquidity shock where all banks su¤er a liquidity shock C. However,
unlike the universal banking regime, in a low aggregate state banks instead of issuing securities
in a secondary share market, call o¤ the loan and sell the capital at a salvage value m. Thus we
merge the two states x and l in a single state where banks liquidate the project early and pay
zero interest on saving deposits.
Banks zero expected prot condition thus changes to:
E = h(pRg + (1  p)Rb)  (1  h)m  h(1  )C   F (1 + rh)  0
where Rg and Rb are the payments stipulated by the banks in good and bad states, g and b
The expected prot of the bank reects the following facts. First, the bank receives pay-o¤
from the project only in the high state with no liquidity shock which explains the rst term.
Second, banks sell o¤ the capital at the salvage value m and do not pay interest in states l and x,
which explains the second term. Third, the liquidity shock C hits the bank with the probability
h(1  ) that explains the third term. Finally, the last term captures the fact that banks pay
interest with probability h:
For the household, we assume that a stand-in household holds a fractional claim ({) to the
value of the stock (Q) at date 1 and issues out (1  {)Q to others. In equilibrium only a single
share is traded (which means { = 1). The rest of the institutional arrangement is the same as
in the earlier banking scenario.
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Households ow budget constraints are now:
c1 + s+ k + {Q = y +Q+ F (12)
cnx2g = s(1 + r) + {f(k)g  Rg (13)
cnx2b = s(1 + r) + {f(k)
b  Rb (14)
cx2 = cl = s (15)
The optimal control problem is:
Max
fF;Rg ;Rb;k;s;{g
u(c1) + h[pv(c
nx
2g ) + (1  p)v(cnx2b ) + (1  h)v(s)] (16)
subject to (12) through (15).
It is straightforward to check now that derivative of the maximand (16) with respect to the
debt instruments Rg and Rb yields the following rst order conditions:
u0(c1)
1 + rh
= v0(cnx2g ) = v(c
nx
2b ) (17)
which means that cnx2g = c
nx
2b = c
nx
2 (say). Thus debt instruments can eliminate the idiosyncratic
risks in a state of no liquidity shock.28 However, full consumption insurance is not possible
because cnx2g = c
nx
2b 6= cx2 = cl: In addition, a positive risk premium (RP ) arises that is given by
the following expression:
RP =
(1  h)v0(s)
hv0(cnx2 )
> 0 (18)
The failure of full consumption risk sharing and the emergence of a positive risk premium
stands in sharp contrast with universal banking. In the latter case, the presence a secondary stock
market mimics a complete market scenario and enables the household to strike full consumption
insurance through the e¢ cient operation of the equity market. On the other hand, in a stand
alone banking system, the nancial markets are fundamentally incomplete due to insu¢ cient
number of nancial instruments. This makes full consumption insurance impossible.29
The issue still arises whether private citizens could be better o¤ in a stand alone banking
28Note that unlike universal banking optimal Rg is not equal to Rb. Rather Rg  Rb =(g   b)f(k) to ensure
consumption equalization between good and bad states.
29 In a companion paper with borrowers moral hazard (Banerji and Basu, 2015), we arrive at a similar conclusion.
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system as opposed to a universal banking environment where information friction is endemic.
Table 6 makes an expected utility comparison of the stand alone banking system with the same
as in the universal banking system with information friction for di¤erent values of probabilities,
h and  around the baseline levels. The expected utility is uniformly higher in the latter
banking arrangement. One needs to be careful about this kind of expected utility comparison
because such a comparison is very model specic and it does not capture numerous features
of both banking systems. Nevertheless, one can at best conclude that everything else equal,
private welfare is higher in a scenario of universal banking where risk diversication opportunities
exist even though conict of interest between bankers and share holders is present as opposed
to a stand alone banking regime where all these risk sharing opportunities are shut down by
legislation.
Table 6: Expected utilties in universal and stand alone banking systems
 !
h# 0.766 0.78 0.79
0.92
EUu=  0:42
EUn=  2:49
EUu=  0:42
EUn=  2:14
EUu=  0:41
EUn=  1:96
0.93
EUu=  0:40
EUn=  2:26
EUu=  0:40
EUn=  1:99
EUu=  0:39
EUn=  1:84
0.94
EUu=  0:38
EUn=  2:09
EUu=  0:38
EUn=  1:87
EUu=  0:38
EUn=  1:75
Note: EUu = Expected utility in the universal banking
and EUn = Expected utility in the stand alone banking
IX. Conclusion
The universal banking system has been a subject of controversy especially in the wake of
current nancial crisis. The critics argue that such a system could inict excessive risks on the
nancial system. In this paper, we evaluate the nature of such risks and the consequent impact
on overall banking activities. We nd that discounting of stocks, volatilities in consumption,
pushing of loans and excessive savings could emerge if hidden information is pervasive and if
particularly the probability of bad aggregate shock is high.
The major policy question still remains open whether Glass-Steagall banking should be
brought back and ring fencing should be strengthened. The recommendation of the independent
banking commission in the UK and the recent trends in the US banking system point to this
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direction. While a full blown comparison of universal banking and a stand-alone banking systems
is beyond the scope of this paper, one can argue on the basis of our model that a universal banking
system could e¢ ciently allocate risk and could replicate the rst best optimum under an ideal
scenario of no information friction. In the presence of information friction, the undesirable
consequences have to be weighed against the ine¢ ciency imposed by the articial separation
between commercial and investment banking in a Glass-Steagall banking regime. The universal
banking could work well if the regulatory authorities are committed to enforce strict disclosure
of regimes to eliminate the information frictions. This together with a small punitive tax on
trading of stocks can reduce the lemon problem of the universal banking and can improve the
e¢ ciency of the banking sector although it could still entail some welfare loss due to a blanket
tax in all banksprots.
Appendix
A. Equilibrium Conditions
In equilibrium, three conditions hold:
1. Each bank stipulates an optimal contract laid out in proposition 1 with each household
taking the average capital stock, K and average contingent payments
 
d as given.
2. Expectations are consistent which means k = K :
3. All markets clear which means:
 In the contingent claims market at date 1, each banks state contingent shares are given
by gg(k) dggg(k) and
bg(k) db
bg(k)
while households shares are given by dggg(k) and
db
bg(k)
.
 In the secondary share market at date 1.5, the demand for shares equals the supply which
means qN = z = C:
 Goods markets clear at each date which mean
At date 1, c1 + k =
~
y   rhNFI = y
At date 2,
h[pg + (1  p)b]g(k) + (1  h)m  h(1  )C(1 + r) = Ec2 
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h[pc
nx
2g + (1  p)cnx2b ] + h(1  )[pcx2g + (1  p)cx2b] + (1  h)c2l (19)
The following remarks about market clearing conditions are in order: First the contingent
claims di are not traded in a market. These are stipulated by optimal contracts and that is
why there is no price attached to each such contingent claim. Second, the secondary shares
are traded in a market that opens at date 1.5. The demand for such shares is z which is the
amount a household agent apportions from her savings. The supply is the amount that banks
issue consequent on a liquidity shock. We assume that given q, banks issue shares exactly worth
the amount of the exogenous liquidity crunch C: This means that qN = z = C
Third, about the date 1 goods market clearing conditions, the imbalance between saving
(s) and loan (f) is nanced by net foreign investment (NFI  f   s) at a xed world interest
rate (r) after adjusting for the probability of aggregate high state (h). Although the payment
from such net foreign investment comes at date 2, we net out the interest payment from date
1 endowment (
~
y) as a xed transfer payment. This explains the presence of the term rhNFI
and why y =
~
y   rhNFI. Finally, the date 2 goods market clearing condition basically
means that the right hand side term which is the consumption plus the foreign debt retirement
aggregated across all individuals must balance the corresponding left hand side term which is
the aggregate output net of the liquidity shock including the interest payment on it. Since this
shock is exogenous, it appears like a tax on date 2 output. This explains the presence of the
term h(1  )C(1 + r) on the left hand side of (19).30
B. Proof of Proposition 1
Plugging consumption of individual agents in each contingency outlined above in the expected
utility function, we get:
Max EU = [u(y + f   s  k)] + h[pvfdg + s(1 + r)g+ (1  p)vfdb + s(1 + r)g]
+h(1  )[pvfdg + (s  z)(1 + r) + z
q
E
~
Xg+ (1  p)vfdb + (s  z)(1 + r) + z
q
E
~
Xg]
+(1  h)v(s)
30 It is easy to verify that the Walras law holds here so that if all but one market clears, then adding all the
budget constraints would ensure that the remainder market must clear as well. To see this, one can plug the
budget constraints (4) through (9) and the zero prot condition ((vi) in Proposition 1 into the date 2 aggregate
demand for good (Ec2) and by using the secondary market equilibrium condition (qsn = C = Z) in the resulting
expression will verify that the market for goods at date 2 automatically clears.
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subject to:
b = h[pfgg(k)  dgg+ (1  p)fbg(k)  dbg] + (1  h)m  f:(1 + rh) = 0
First order conditions with respect to dg,db,s,k and z respectively are :
dg :
u
0
(c1)
1 + rh
= v
0
(cnx2g ) + (1  )v
0
(cx2g) (A1)
db :
u
0
(c1)
1 + rh
= v
0
(cnx2b ) + (1  )v
0
(cx2b) (A2)
s :
u
0
(c1)
1 + rh
= h[pv
0
(cnx2g ) + (1  p)v
0
(cnx2b )] (A3)
+(1  )h[pv0(cx2g) + (1  p)v
0
(cx2b)](1 + r) + (1  h)v
0
(c2l)
k : u0(c1)[hg
0
(k)  (1 + r)] = 0 (A4)
z : [pv
0
(cx2g) + (1  p)v
0
(cx2b)](
E
~
X
q
  (1 + r))  0 (A5)
(i) We will show now that dg = db = d:
Let us suppose that dg > db. Let us make the adjustment such that dg is reduced and db is
increased so as to reduce the gap in such a way that the zero prot constraint is not a¤ected,
i.e. [pdg + (1   p)db] is constant. Hence, [p(dg  1) + (1   p)(db + 2)] is a constant so that
(1  p)2 = p1:
Now, evaluate the expected utility with small increments that satisfy the above equality.
EU = h[f pv0(cnx2g )1 + (1  p)v
0
(cnx2b )2g+ (1  )f pv
0
(cx2g)1 + (1  p)v
0
(cx2b)2g]
)
EU = h[fv0(cnx2b )  v
0
(cnx2g )g+ (1  )fv
0
(cx2b)  v
0
(cx2g)g](1  p)2 > 0 (A6)
Since, cns2b < c
ns
2g it implies that v
0
(cnx2b )   v
0
(cnx2g ) > 0 (due to concave utility function) and
since cx2b < c
x
2g, v
0
(cx2b)  v
0
(cx2g) > 0 and 2 > 0 because db was increased.
Hence, adjustment can be made until v
0
(cnx2b )  v
0
(cnx2g ) = 0 and v
0
(cx2b)  v
0
(cx2g) = 0. Hence,
cnx2b = c
nx
2g and c
x
2b = c
x
2g which implies dg = db.
One can start with the reverse inequality dg < db and make the opposite adjustments to
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reach this equality. This proves (i).
(ii) and (iii): From (A5), it follows that (E
eX
q   (1 + r)) = 0 and plugging the result in
cx2g = dg + (s  z)(1 + r) + zqE eX and cx2b = db + (s  z)(1 + r) + zqE eX and using the result from
(i) that dg = db = d yields cnx2g = c
nx
2b = c
x
2g = c
x
2b = c2(say). This proves (ii) and (iii).
(iv): The equation (A3) can be written as
u0(c1)
1 + rh
= h[pfv0(cnx2g )+(1 )v
0
(cnx2g )g+(1 p)fv
0
(cnx2b )+(1 )v
0
(cx2b)g](1+r)+(1 h)v
0
(c2l)
Plugging (A1) and (A2), u
0
(c1)
1+rh
= h
u
0
(c1)(1+r)
1+rh
+ (1   h)v0(c2l) and by rearrangement, we
get:
u
0
(c1) = [
(1  h)(1 + rh)
1  h + h(1  ) ]v
0
(s)
which proves (iv).
The part (v) follows from the straightforward di¤erentiation with respect to k and the binding
zero prot constraint of the intermediary together with (i) yields the last proposition. //
C. Proof of Proposition 2
Using the same line of reasoning as in Proposition 1, one can establish that
v
0
(cnx2b )  v
0
(cnx2g ) = 0 (B1)
and
v
0
(cx2b)  v
0
(cx2g) = 0 (B2)
On the other hand, the rst order condition for z is:
v
0
(da + (sa   z)(1 + r) + z
qa
E
~
Xa):
(
E eX
qa
  (1 + r)
)
h(1  r) = v0(sa   z)(1  h)
Since v0(:) > 0) EfXaqa   (1 + r) > 0) cx2g > cnx2b . Hence, (B1) and (B2) can hold if
cx2g = c
x
2b > c
nx
2g = c
nx
2b (B3)
The part (ia) follows from the above result and the two rst order conditions with respect
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to fdg; dbg
dg :
u0(c1)
1+h
= v0(cnx2g ) + (1  )v0(cx2g)
db :
u0(c1)
1+h
= v0(cnx2b ) + (1  )v0(cx2b)
The part (iia) follows directly from the rst order with respect for z, which is,
v0fda + (sa   z)(1 + r) + z
qa
E
~
XagfE
eXa
qa
  (1 + r)gfh(1  )g = v0f(sa   z)g(1  h)
The part (iiia) follows from (B3) and (ia).
Finally, (iva) and (va) can be shown exactly using similar line of reasoning as in the earlier
section. //
D. Proof of Proposition 3
All variables are evaluated at their full information values obtained in the proposition 1. This
means that we start from a full information equilibrium with zero information friction. Thus at
date 1, in the absence of information friction, c1 = c1a. Given the same r, it means that k = ka:
From the date 1 resource constraint (4), it follows that f   s = fa  sa: .
Starting from this scenario of no information friction, with the onset of information friction,
z and the risk premium terms turn positive from 0. Given c1 = c1a; from proposition 1(iv) and
proposition 2(iva) it follows that v0(s) = v0(sa   z) which means that s < sa. Since f   s = fa
 sa; the immediate implication is that f < fa:
Next compare the expressions for f and fa in proposition 1(vi) and proposition 2vi(a)
evaluated at equilibrium qN = C and note that since f   fa < 0, the following inequality holds
h(d  da) + C(1  h) > 0
For a su¢ ciently small C, the above inequality means that d > da //
E. Proof of Proposition 4
Using the risk sharing results from proposition 2, the expected utility (EUa) in (10) can be
written in a compact form as:
EUa = u(y + fa   sa   k) + h[v(cnx2a ) + (1  )v(cx2a)] + (1  h)v(cl2a)
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Next note that the expected utility under full information (with full risk sharing) is given
by:
EU = u(y + f   s  k) + hv(c2) + (1  h)v(cl2)
Since our baseline of comparison is full information equilibrium, by construction f   s = fa
 sa and cl2 = cl2a (see proposition 3).
The comparison of two expected utilities EU and EUa thus hinges on the relative magnitudes
of v(c2) and [v(cnx2a ) + (1  )v(cx2a)]: Note from proposition 1(iii) that c2 = s(1 + r) + d: On
the other hand, recall from proposition 2(iiia), cnx2 = da + sa(1 + r) and c
x
2a = da + sa(1 + r) +n
E ~Xa
q   (1 + r)
o
 c:
Since the comparison is made in the neighbourhood of a full information equilibrium, we set
the interest rate r such that
c2 = c
nx
2a + (1  )cx2a
By strict concavity of the utility function (applying Jensens inequality), it then follows that
v(c2) > v(c
nx
2a ) + (1  )v(cx2a): This proves that EU > EUa: //
F. Methodology for Model Simulation
Case of symmetric Information
With a log utility function and Cobb-Douglas production function g(k) = k the equation
system in Proposition 1 reduces to:
(d+ s(1 + r)) = (1 + rh)c1 based on (i) (20)
s =

(1  h)(1 + rh)
1  h + rh(1  )

c1 based on (iv) (21)
k =
241 + rh
h
 

35 11  based on (v) (22)
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f =
h(
 
k   d) + (1  h)m
1 + rh
based on (vi) after plugging qN   C = 0 (23)
Given the loan market clearing condition s = f , the rst period resource constraint for the
economy reduces to c1 + k = y which after plugging into (21) and (22), one gets
(d+ s(1 + r)) = (1 + rh)(y   k) (24)
:
s =

(1  h)(1 + rh)
1  h + rh(1  )

(y   k) (25)
Eqs (22), (23), (24) and (25) solve for d; f; k; r. The security price q can be obtained by
using the equation q =
 
k d
1+r :
Case of Asymmetric Information
With the same log utility function and the Cobb-Douglas production function, the risk
sharing condition (ia) in Proposition 2 (together with the loan market clearing condition, sa = fa
and the share market clearing condition z = C) reduces to

(y   ka)(1 + rah) =

da + sa(1 + ra)
+
1  
da + sa(1 + ra) +RP  C (26)
where RP stands for risk premium equal to
n
E ~Xa
qa
  (1 + ra)
o
and the subscript a stands
for the interest in the asymmetric information scenario.
Next use the expression for risk premium in Proposition 2(iia) and solve the equilibrium
RP (imposing the aggregate consistency condition k = K) explicitly as follows:
RP = 1:
(da + fa(1 + r))
fa   C(1 + 1) (27)
where
1 =
1  
(1  )
After plugging the goods market clearing condition c1+k = y and the loan market and share
market clearing conditions fa = sa and z = C, Proposition 2(iva) reduces to
(fa   C) =

(1  h)(1 + rah)
1  h + rah(1  )

(y   ka) (28)
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The investment equation is the same as before and can be written as:
ka =
241 + rah
h
 

35 11  (29)
Finally the zero prot condition reduces to
fa =
h(
 
g(ka) 
 
da) + (1  h)(m+ C)
1 + rah
(30)
Eq (26) through (30) can be solved for ve unknowns, fa; da; ra; ka; RP: The resulting share
price qa is given by
 
ka da
1+ra+RP
:==
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